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Many urgent problems that societies currently face—from climate change to a global
pandemic—require citizens to engage with scientific information as members of
democratic societies as well as to solve problems in their personal lives. Most often,
to solve their epistemic aims (aims directed at achieving knowledge and understanding)
regarding such socio-scientific issues, individuals search for information online, where
there exists a multitude of possibly relevant and highly interconnected sources of
different perspectives, sometimes providing conflicting information. The paper provides a
review of the literature aimed at identifying (a) constraints and affordances that scientific
knowledge and the online information environment entail and (b) individuals’ cognitive
and motivational processes that have been found to hinder, or conversely, support
practices of engagement (such as critical information evaluation or two-sided dialogue).
Doing this, a conceptual framework for understanding and fostering what we call online
engagement with scientific information is introduced, which is conceived as consisting of
individual engagement (engaging on one’s own in the search, selection, evaluation, and
integration of information) and dialogic engagement (engaging in discourse with others
to interpret, articulate and critically examine scientific information). In turn, this paper
identifies individual and contextual conditions for individuals’ goal-directed and effortful
online engagement with scientific information.
Keywords: epistemic cognition, argumentation, scientific literacy, digital literacy, multiple documents literacy,
online engagement with scientific information

INTRODUCTION
Socio-scientific issues—from climate change to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic (we will use the
latter issue as an example in this article)—hold many consequences for personal, social, and civic life
(Feinstein and Waddington, 2020). For such issues, defining the problem as well as coming up with
possible solutions often rests on knowledge and evidence from the natural but also from the social
sciences, which are well-beyond most citizens expertise (Zeidler, 2014). Nonetheless, most citizens
want and need to stay informed and will likely seek information online, as searching for information
on specific science-related issues is usually done on the Internet (National Science Board, 2018). In
recent years, the percentage of people who use the Internet to learn about science has substantially

1

December 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 572744

Hendriks et al.

Online Engagement With Scientific Information

increased, and there, they encounter a wide variety of digital
media formats, including social media (Pavelle and Wilkinson,
2020). In this article, we review literature on the cognitive
and motivational processes underlying online engagement with
scientific information (OESI) that individuals employ in order
to utilize the affordances and overcome the challenges of
searching for and dealing with scientific information in online
information environments.
“Engagement” is an elusive concept but has been
conceptualized as a behavioral manifestation of motivation
or productive participation in a learning activity (e.g., Eccles and
Wang, 2012; Bråten et al., 2018). Similar to previous models of
engagement (Guthrie and Klauda, 2016), we understand OESI
as goal-directed (that is, directed at achieving epistemic aims)
and effortful activity in dealing with scientific information in
online information environments, where this activity can be
both individual and dialogic; is supported by cognitive, but also
motivational processes; and leads to the individual arriving at
epistemic ends (the target of epistemic aims). In the following, we
describe our heuristic model in more detail (see Figure 1 for a
graphical representation).
Central to our understanding of OESI is individuals’ adoption
of epistemic aims. In their AIR model of epistemic cognition,
Chinn et al. (2014; see also, Chinn et al., 2011), identify epistemic
aims, ideals and reliable processes that individuals apply to
achieve epistemic ends. We describe all three components here
briefly, before spelling out their relation to our notion of OESI.
First, epistemic aims are “a subset of the goals people adopt,
specifically those goals related to inquiry and finding things out”
(Chinn et al., 2011; p. 142), and they are directed at achieving
epistemic ends, for example, gathering “true” facts about a topic,
avoiding misinformation on the topic, or acquiring a deeper
understanding. Second, how much an epistemic end is valued will
affect the selection of epistemic ends. An information seeker will
review the success of an information search along her epistemic
ideals, which could be described as the standard that determines
whether a person has achieved her epistemic end; such a
standard might be whether the information comes from a highly
authoritative source or whether it is based on empirical evidence
(Chinn et al., 2014; see also section Epistemic (meta-)cognition).
And, third, to achieve epistemic ends, reliable processes are
applied, which specify the conditions and cognitive operations
to achieve reliable knowledge. Importantly, which processes are
deemed reliable depends on the context and the individual’s
knowledge about the processes. For example, while observation
is usually a reliable process to find things out about the (natural)
world, individuals may overestimate the reliability of this process,
which may lead to misconceptions (Chinn et al., 2014).
Epistemic aims underlie OESI and moderate transitions from
stage to stage in our heuristic model (see Figure 1). First, when
an individual is confronted with a socio-scientific topic in online
media environments, which harbor specific constraints and
affordances (see section Constraints and Affordances Entailed
in the Context of OESI), this elicits cognitive and motivational
processes, possibly leading the individual to form (an) epistemic
aim(s). If so, these processes become more goal directed (as
the individuals strives to arrive at an epistemic end). For
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example, if the individual adopts the epistemic aim of avoiding
misinformation, she might consider more reliable processes
in her search for information, such as referring to fact-check
websites, which allow her to compare her achievements with her
epistemic ideals (e.g., that accepted information must be evidence
based). However, to adequately deal with context constraints and
affordances (e.g., the amount of misinformation present in social
media), the employed (reliable) processes must also be effortful.
Such goal-directed and effortful engagement is what we describe
as OESI, and we further differentiate individual engagement
(engaging on one’s own in the search, selection, evaluation, and
integration of information) and dialogic engagement (engaging
in discourse with others to interpret, articulate and critically
examine scientific information).We assume that individuals will
not follow a specific sequential order when engaging in these two
types of engagement and their associated processes, but instead,
depending on the situation and the individual’s epistemic aim,
any process could be the beginning of an episode of engagement
and could lead to any other of the processes—within and between
the two parts –, whereby the individual may even switch back
and forth, commit to two processes at the same time, or skip a
process. Finally, it is also possible for individuals to move back to
previous stages: Practices of engagement may, in turn, motivate
cognitive and motivational processes (e.g., if the individual feels
self-efficient during critical information evaluation, she might
be more motivated to achieve her epistemic aims). Furthermore,
when the individuals arrives at her epistemic ends—or, instead,
is partially or entirely unsuccessful in achieving her aim—she
might reconsider her initial epistemic aims and enter another
episode of engagement.
However, OESI may not lead to similar (and similarly
measurable) achievements as does engagement in formal
education settings. By defining outcomes as arriving at one’s
epistemic ends, we aim to highlight a central dilemma. Defining
a successful outcome largely depends on which standards define
achievement: personal (e.g., being content with a personal
decision; relieving anxiety) or normative (e.g., achieving full
understanding of a concept in alignment with the current
scientific state of knowledge). We are aware that these aims
require very different cognitive and motivational processes;
consequently, we focus on engagement that is moderated by
individuals’ epistemic aims and we review research to find out
which reliable processes are beneficial for achieving such aims,
and for dealing with context constraints and affordances in the
process [in contrast, Greene et al. (2020) recently focused on
incidental learning in online environments]. Thus, the purpose
of this article is to review the literature in several related
fields in educational science and educational psychology to
identify aspects of the context, and of individual’s cognitive
and motivational prerequisites that are especially beneficial or
detrimental to effortful and productive OESI. Only when it
is goal-directed and effortful can OESI lead to an individual
successfully arriving at their respective epistemic ends.
Educational researchers and educational psychology
researchers have long investigated individuals’ reasoning
and engagement with scientific and online information, and
have posited educational implications; these researchers have
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FIGURE 1 | Heuristic model of online engagement with scientific information.

delved much deeper into specific aspects relevant to our heuristic
framework (e.g., Alexander and The Disciplined Reading
and Learning Research Laboratory, 2012; Leu et al., 2013;
Fischer et al., 2014; Tabak, 2015; Cho and Afflerbach, 2017;
Breakstone et al., 2018; Britt et al., 2019; Coiro, 2020). Taking
past conceptualizations into account, we use the term “online
engagement with scientific information” not to introduce
an entirely new concept or to replace any related concept;
instead, here we review this literature, specifically to provide a
comprehensive overview of OESI—focusing its context and on
cognitive and motivational processes that support it—to derive
implications for education and instruction.

when issues entail risk, which can exist both on a personal
level (e.g., health risks) and on a societal level (e.g., economic
risks). Second, scientific knowledge is intrinsically uncertain
(Friedman et al., 1999), whereby uncertainty arises not only
during evidence gathering processes (e.g., measurement error,
inadequacies of measurement), but also from lack of knowledge
or expert disagreement (van der Bles et al., 2019). Scientific
uncertainty is becoming increasingly apparent to a larger public
as the COVID-19 pandemic progresses, because evidence is
rapidly accumulated and published online (sometimes before
peer-review), such that public debates often involve highly
uncertain scientific knowledge.
Both the complexity and uncertainty of scientific knowledge
are amplified in online information environments. Online, there
are many possibly relevant information sources that vary in
format (e.g., text, video), in genre (e.g., scientific, journalistic,
opinion, entertainment), and in explanatory power (e.g., relevant
to the topic and founded in evidence). Moreover, sources are
highly interconnected; that is, online documents not only embed
and interlink diverse formats and genres (Alexander and The
Disciplined Reading and Learning Research Laboratory, 2012;
Goldman and Scardamalia, 2013), but interconnectedness is also
established when sources cite and embed sources of different
quality (e.g., when a scientist is interviewed by conspiracyaffiliated news sites), or when scientific arguments are disputed
by industry stakeholders. To the individual, this amplifies the
complexity of an already complex scientific topic. But also,
scientific uncertainty can be amplified, especially as new and
yet uncertain results are highly accessible online. In particular
(digital), media pieces often display disagreement between
experts (Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004), such as when scientists
openly disagreed with statements by the WHO about the
effectiveness of wearing face masks to protect against COVID19 (Howard, 2020). Furthermore, around publicly contested
issues like climate change and vaccination, skeptics have been
especially strategic about utilizing uncertainty to manufacture
doubt around scientific knowledge on the issue (Oreskes and
Conway, 2011) and attack scientific evidence especially in digital
media (e.g., Elgesem et al., 2015; Mercer, 2018).
As a result of these constraints, laypeople find it challenging
to engage with scientific knowledge online to achieve epistemic

Constraints and Affordances Entailed in
the Context of OESI
Information that we consider relevant for OESI is acquired in
online environments and (a) contains an elaborate claim on
a socio-scientific issue, or (b) is detailed enough to serve as
evidence, or (c) both. For example, we would consider as relevant
any text, audio, and video sources, as well as images and graphical
representations (e.g., a tweet featuring a graph, a YouTube video,
an open access scientific article), but we would not consider
as relevant a meme consisting only of a photograph and some
text, which is only meant to entertain. For individuals to deal
with such information to achieve their epistemic aims, they
must overcome the constraints and utilize the affordances that
is entailed in the respective contexts (Barzilai and Chinn, 2019).
We will briefly outline these in Table 1.
Two characteristics of scientific knowledge are especially
challenging for laypeople to deal with (Bromme and Goldman,
2014; Hendriks and Kienhues, 2019). First, scientific knowledge
is characterized by complexity (Keil, 2008) as scientific
theories vary in depth (deep causal complexity) and breadth
(interrelatedness with other theories or concepts) (Bromme and
Goldman, 2014). Consequently, full understanding of scientific
phenomena requires both highly specialized knowledge in
one field (e.g., virology) and related background knowledge
from many other disciplines (e.g., biology, chemistry). For
many questions in socio-scientific issues, the complexity of
(natural) scientific knowledge is further amplified by manifold
interrelations with the social sciences. This is especially the case
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TABLE 1 | Some context constraints and affordances of Online Engagement with Scientific Information (OESI).
Scientific knowledge

Online information environment

Constraints and
affordances

Examples

Constraints and
affordances

Examples

Complexity

Complexity of knowledge in
depth and breadth

Full understanding of the transmission of
the SARS-Cov-19 virus requires
knowledge from a variety of disciplines
(e.g., infectology, virology, epidemiology)
and relevant background knowledge
from other disciplines (e.g., biology,
chemistry).
Above this, when deciding whether to
re-open schools during a pandemic
social science knowledge is required
(e.g., from educational sciences)

Interconnected and
embedded sources

A Wikipedia page includes
hyperlinks to other Wikipedia
pages.
A science blog entry consisting of
mainly text embeds pictures and
graphs (embedded formats).
A science-skeptic social media
entry embeds a video of an
interview with a scientist
(hierarchical structure of formats
and credibility cues).

Uncertainty

Uncertainty of evidence

A scientific measurement is imprecise.
A scientific study cannot be replicated.
It is yet unknown which long-term health
effects remain after an infection with
SARS-Cov-19.
Scientists disagree about the
effectiveness of a treatment.

Use of uncertainty to
discredit science

Social Media entry advising against
wearing cloth face masks, citing
uncertainty about their effectiveness
and uncertainty about adverse
effects.
An online newspaper article using
balance reporting (devoting the
same space to both sides of the
issue) even though there is
consensus within science.

Risks

Entailed risks on the
personal and societal level

Health consequences of infection with
SARS-Cov-19.
Economic repercussions of the
pandemic.
Psychological effects of isolation during
the pandemic.
Educational effects of
digital-only schooling.

Disinformation,
misinformation and “fake
news”

Disinformation: a member of the
far-right deliberately posts on
Facebook that scientists in China
created the new Coronavirus.
Misinformation: Someone shares
this post considering it to be
credible.
“Fake news”: mimicking the layout
of “real news” and sensationalizing
(scientific) news to draw attention
and promote sharing.

Level of
Gatekeeping

High editorial gatekeeping,
highly authoritative sources,
limited access

Scientific journal articles authored by
scientific experts (sometimes published
as pre-print or open access).
Reports by a selected group of experts
(e.g., initiated institutions like the WHO
or within scientific academies)

Low editorial
gatekeeping, high
diversity of sources, easy
access

Science blog authored by a
scientist.
Journalistic article published on a
newspaper’s website.
Youtube video by a person with a
doctoral degree.
Facebook entry by a layperson.

Communicative
habits

Scientific genre

Almost all scientific publications are
journal articles (often enhanced with
representations).
Most scientific journal articles follow a
specific structure, style, format, and use
of scientific jargon.

Variety of formats (e.g.,
text, video,
representations), and
genre (e.g., informational,
narrative)

A scientist blogs about her study
using comprehensible language.
A Youtuber uses personalized
language.
A narrative video about
virus reproduction.

Agency

Relevance to everyday- and
societal questions

Immediate relevance of questions to
behavior (e.g., washing hands, wearing
a face mask), social and family life (e.g.,
visiting grandparents) and civic life (e.g.,
voting, protesting).

User agency

Users can decide what information
to consider (e.g., by ordering an
Email-newsletter or following certain
social media accounts), but also
how to consume it (e.g., free
surfing, deciding to watch a video
instead of reading a text).

Social Affordances

Argumentation as intrinsic
to science

Social practices of science (e.g.,
conferences, peer-review, consensus
building).
Public Engagement with Science (Citizen
Science, engaging members the public
in generating research questions or
funding decisions).

Social affordances,
interactivity

Digital media entail affordances for
immediate audience feedback and
users’ own active contributions:
e.g., Like-button, comment section,
discussion forum, creating own
content.
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information in order to achieve their epistemic aims on their
own—to form “true” beliefs or understanding—individuals
must employ reliable processes. To describe the necessary
cognitive processes during an information search, we will
first describe the MD-Trace (Multiple Documents-Task-based
Relevance Assessment and Content Extraction) model (Rouet
and Britt, 2011). According to this model, a search is initialized
by an individual’s mental representation of the searching task
in a task model (see also, Rouet et al., 2017). Further, her
task model also involves considering available knowledge and
resources, such as prior topic knowledge and knowledge about
search strategies (Rouet et al., 2017). As a result of these processes,
the individual determines whether further information is needed
to fulfill task demands and against what standard the search result
should be compared. Having initiated the search process, she tests
whether the sought information is relevant to her task model
and selects documents accordingly. To process and evaluate the
selected documents, the individual mentally represents them in
an intertext model, which links contents of the documents to
their meta-information (information about, e.g., the source, date,
or rank of the search result), and includes intertext predicates
(e.g., possible conflicts). Integrating information into the mental
model allows the individual to coherently represent her acquired
understanding of the issue. Finally, she may compare this
integrated mental model against her initial task model to decide
whether to redo certain steps of the search task or to go ahead
with creating a search product (e.g., write an essay or make
notes next to search results to further concretize a search task).
However, at each step, individuals face several challenges (Rouet
and Britt, 2011). In this section, we will summarize research on
how searching, selecting, processing, and integrating scientific
information are supported or hindered by aspects of the context
and the individual’s cognitive and motivational processes.

aims; yet, the context of OESI also entails affordances that
individuals can utilize. Socio-scientific issues may motivate
individuals to purposefully engage with scientific information,
because the scientific questions are highly relevant, and are
often contextualized in everyday life and societal questions
(Feinstein and Waddington, 2020). Science fundamentally rests
on the active dialogue about and the critique of scientific
claims (Osborne, 2010), and members of the public can now
contribute more to this dialogue through efforts such as the
movement toward Public Engagement with Science (Leshner,
2003). Furthermore, increased access to scientific information via
digital media creates even more opportunities for individuals to
connect with science (Brossard and Scheufele, 2013). Especially
because scientific knowledge is often communicated in very
formalized ways in terms of formats and language use, digital
media platforms grant laypeople the opportunity to learn
about science in various different formats and in much more
accessible and engaging language; for example, YouTube videos
often use an entertaining and narrative style to communicate
quality informational content. However, because individuals can
access such a wide variety of sources, they must be able to
identify not only trustworthy sources, but also communicative
intentions to distinguish, for example, institutional public
relations information from critical science journalism, and
even from science-related entertainment. Moreover, online,
individuals must be especially aware of messages that are
deliberately posted to disseminate false information, called
disinformation or “fake news” (a term that has also been
weaponized in political contexts; Molina et al., 2019). In contrast,
misinformation is spread without malevolent intentions (Molina
et al., 2019; Scheufele and Krause, 2019), but it is still a
threat toward an individual’s engagement with scientific claims
and evidence.
The requirement to effortfully seek out credible information
represent the downsides of individuals’ ability to be active agents
in using and interacting with online digital media platforms
(Evans et al., 2016), where they can deliberately choose to engage
with certain technologies, media, and content. Furthermore,
individuals may even create their own content and—utilizing
digital media’s social affordances (Hopkins, 2016)—interact and
engage in dialogue with other users.
In the article, we refer to research that describes which
cognitive and motivational processes people employ to deal
with these context constraints and affordances. While we do
differentiate some constraints and affordances for the two
contexts, some individuals may perceive an aspect that we
introduced as constraint to be more of an affordance, and vice
versa. For example, a comment section to a blog entry might
initially be an affordance, but dealing with a high number
of reader comments may hinder individuals’ evaluation of
information, thus making it a constraint.

Constraints and Affordances of the Online
Information Environment to Individual
Engagement
When searching for information, media affordances determine
how specific technologies are used. That is, while users may
deliberatively choose to use technologies or digital media
for the potential features they offer; at the same time, such
features also determine the ways in which users can engage
with the technology. For example, when acquiring (scientific)
information, individuals tend to use only one type of search
engine, which might be enforced by the default use of digital
assistants commonly installed on smartphones and computers
(Kammerer et al., 2018). Additionally, characteristics of a search
engine result page (SERP), such as the algorithm it uses to present
search results, the interface it offers for users to manually filter
search results, or the sparsity of information it displays (i.e., a
title, short excerpt of the web page, and the URL) may influence
whether an individual selects any of search results and whether
they perform any further search queries. Research indicates that
individuals would rather view the highest-ranked search results
within a SERP (e.g., Salmerón et al., 2013; Haas and Unkel, 2017),
even if those results are less relevant (Pan et al., 2007). Further,

INDIVIDUAL ENGAGEMENT
Searching for information to achieve epistemic aims is an
iterative and dynamic process. To make sense of scientific
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refrain from citing them, even if they entail relevant first-hand
information about an issue (List et al., 2017).
Further, the communicative design of scientific information
appears to affect its evaluation. Using a more “scientific” language
style, such as including descriptions of scientific methods and
in-text citations, leads readers to judge the information as more
“scientific” and believable overall (Thomm and Bromme, 2012).
Over a series of studies, Scharrer and colleagues (e.g., Scharrer
et al., 2012, 2017) found that when a scientific text was written in
a comprehensible fashion (compared to when the text contained
technical terms and was, thus, incomprehensible for laypeople),
readers were more easily persuaded by the text’s arguments and
less inclined to consult further expert advice. Furthermore, when
individuals are engaged online in argumentation, presenting a
piece of information in the form of question and answer rather
than in the context of a traditional text may be a more effective
way to promote the acquisition of factual knowledge (Iordanou
et al., 2019a). The question-and-answer format appears to have
facilitated learning, possibly by highlighting the potential use of a
particular piece of information.
Another feature of online environments is that not only social
media and blogs but also many online news sites allow for user
comments, which might influence how users evaluate the content
of the main article. For example, attitudes about a scientific
issue may be influenced by the perceived consensus among
other readers expressed through blog comments (Anderson et al.,
2014; Lewandowsky et al., 2019). Furthermore, in some instances
recommendations and social endorsements might play a role in
evaluation and could reflect on evaluations of the credibility of
health messages and of the expertise of the author (Jucks and
Thon, 2017). In one study, when Facebook posts were shared
by a close friend, this only raised the credibility of otherwise
distrusted news sources (participants rated their trust in several
news sources prior to reading the posts) but not of trusted sources
(Oeldorf-Hirsch and DeVoss, 2020).
To sum up, during the first steps of searching for and
selecting relevant information, characteristics of the online
environment [e.g., (social) affordances of SERPs and digital
media, communicative habits in digital media] may constrain,
but also inspire effortful cognitive processes when searching,
selecting and evaluating information. Dual-process theories
propose that—unless task or person characteristics require
it—individuals will default to heuristic processing instead of
effortful and systematic processing (Salmerón et al., 2013).
In an online information search, a variety of heuristic cues
determine whether a search result is credible or relevant to the
task at hand (Hilligoss and Rieh, 2008; Sundar, 2008; Metzger
and Flanagin, 2013). Taraborelli (2008) stated that research has
mainly focused on predictive judgments of credibility evaluation
instead of evaluative judgments; this means that individuals
may often engage in a first selection phase to sort out lowquality information in which superficial cues guide information
selection, whereas in a second step they might engage in more
effortful evaluation (Hilligoss and Rieh, 2008). In fact, in one
study, individuals’ first selection of search results relied on the
order of appearance in a SERP, but they bookmarked more
relevant pages to examine further (Salmerón et al., 2013). In

younger users in particular might select search results based on
superficial cues like the search result’s title (Lai and Farbrot,
2014), or boldface or capitalization (Rouet et al., 2011). Also,
the number of documents that individuals select seems to vary
by task: When individuals are asked to find a discrete answer
to a question (instead of answering in an open-ended way),
they select more documents (List et al., 2016a). Furthermore,
individuals do not use all features of a search engine that perhaps
would allow them to conduct more appropriate search inquiries.
Kammerer and Gerjets (2014) found that interfaces displaying
the results in a three-by-three grid more often led users to
select and view search results according to their trustworthiness
than according to their search rank. Similarly, Salmerón et al.
(2010) found that individuals had more efficient reading times
and displayed more explorative search behavior when using
a graphical-overview interface (i.e., indicating the semantic
relationships between the search results) instead of a standard
list interface. Prior knowledge about the search topic may further
benefit an individual during an information search when the
search engine interface allows it: Experts performed faster and
more accurate searches than laypersons when the interface was
semantically structured (Salmerón et al., 2005).
Second, the interconnectivity and embeddedness of
information sources—both hierarchically (documents that are
interlinked), and horizontally (one document that is embedded
within another)—may be challenging for information seekers to
deal with (Cho and Afflerbach, 2017; Goldman and Scardamalia,
2013). These features call for flexibility in how individuals access
information (Shapiro and Niederhauser, 2004), namely they have
to access information in a non-sequential, non-linear way. This
might require some specific aspect of digital literacy: Although
expert searchers (fact checkers) were found to perform lateral
reading, that is, opening several browser tabs during a search
to check the reliability of a search result, this was not done by
topic experts (historians) or students (Wineburg and McGrew,
2019).
The goal-directed and effortful evaluation of online
information may further be constrained by several context
features of scientific information in digital media environments
(Breakstone et al., 2018; Forzani, 2019), such as genre,
presentation of information (such as the use of distracting
imagery), or other users’ endorsements. Unfortunately,
individuals often use only superficial or unreliable indicators for
determining the credibility of online information (Coiro et al.,
2015; McGrew et al., 2018). For example, individuals may not be
able to distinguish sponsored news content from unbiased news
stories or to identify the verified social media accounts of public
organizations (McGrew et al., 2018). Furthermore, the extent
to which adolescents use social media sites for entertainment
purposes can be negatively related to their ability to discriminate
reliable from unreliable online information (Macedo-Rouet
et al., 2019b). Some online platforms, and especially social media,
seem not to be regarded as trustworthy by individuals in general.
Wikipedia is sometimes dismissed as information source without
considering its inherent quality control (Breakstone et al., 2018).
Evidence suggests that individuals deem Twitter and blog entries
less trustworthy than (for example) newspaper articles and
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conflicting information. In fact, when individuals were surprised
by incorrect answers in a trivia task (especially when their
answers were given with high confidence) they had—as mediated
by curiosity—more motivation to seek out explanations for these
answers and request further information (Vogl et al., 2020).
In even more fundamental ways, the Cognitive Affective
Engagement Model (CAEM) of multiple source use (List
and Alexander, 2017b) addresses “learners’ affective, cognitive,
and behavioral involvement in multiple text use” (List and
Alexander, 2017b, p. 184). Both situational and individual
interest (Schiefele, 2009) have been found to promote learning
and behavior (see also, Deci, 1992). Situational interest is a
state that might be triggered by a single text (for example,
when it is very easily comprehensible or coherent), while
individual interest in a domain or topic is a trait-like
personal characteristic (Schiefele, 2009). In consequence, the
CAEM specifies an affective engagement dimension, which
refers to an information seeker’s interest and motivational
involvement in the task at hand (also affected by topic-specific
attitudes and prior beliefs), whereas the second dimension,
behavioral dispositions, refers to the skills and strategies
necessary for selecting, evaluating, and integrating information
and documents at hand. By crossing these two dimensions,
the CAEM states that learners fall into one of four default
stances that guide their multiple-document comprehension:
A “disengaged learner” selects and uses information without
engaging much in evaluating and integrating. An “affectively
engaged learner” accumulates information while engaging only
in limited integration of multiple documents. An “evaluative
learner” scrutinizes documents for relevance and credibility, but,
due to limited motivational engagement, is less willing or able to
fully integrate selected documents. A “critical analytic learner”
possesses similar skills as the “evaluative learner” regarding
source evaluation and verification, but since the critical analytical
learner is highly motivated to engage in effortful and elaborate
processing, they are able to succeed in integrating information
into a coherent representation of the issue and, thus, might
produce the most successful search result.
In sum, central motivators of goal-directed and effortful OESI
are both personal relevance and topic specific risk perceptions
(both affordances of socio-scientific topics). Furthermore,
experienced information insufficiency may not be the only
motivator to formulate epistemic aims; this may also be
motivated by situational interest and epistemic emotions such as
curiosity. Beyond individuals’ skills to engage in reliable processes
in dealing with scientific information, effortful evaluation and
integration of information may also be fostered or constrained by
emotions (both topic specific, e.g., hope or worry; and epistemic,
i.e., directed at learning and understanding) and motivational
involvement in the task.

another study, individuals did first select links by their titles,
but on second glance they considered cues more indicative
of information quality, like URLs and snippets with brief
descriptions (Hautala et al., 2018).
However, the activity of online searching itself may lead to
a feeling of knowing—the case when an individual perceives
to possess knowledge but cannot actually retrieve it from
memory (Pintrich, 2000; Koriat, 2012). Such an overestimation
of acquired knowledge (Fisher et al., 2015) may result from
representing the Internet as transactive memory (an external,
collective memory system), leading one to better remember
where a previously learned item is stored than to recall the
item itself (Sparrow et al., 2011). Similarly, searchers might
experience a “feeling of findability,” where they overestimate
the availability of information online (Risko et al., 2016). These
problematic assumptions may stem from a failure to distinguish
“what is known” from “how was this knowledge acquired” (Kuhn,
1999). Such knowledge illusions may bias the integrated mental
model of search results and thus, may negatively influence the
integration of information into a coherent representation of the
issue. As such, when misrepresenting acquired knowledge as a
result of an online search, the individual might give up on an
epistemic aim prematurely due to the assumption that it has been
already resolved.

Emotion and Motivation
Central to our understanding of OESI is identifying when
individuals process information more effortfully instead of
heuristically; importantly, the process of formulating epistemic
aims and following through to resolve them might be strongly
influenced by emotion and motivation. Referring back to dualprocess theories, Griffin et al. (1999) identified several motivators
for more systematic processing of information about risk. First,
they found that the central motivators of information seeking
were information insufficiency—when a person experiences a
large gap between current knowledge and her personal sufficiency
threshold (Griffin et al., 1999)—and a perceived normative
pressure to be informed. Information insufficiency can follow
affective responses to perceived risks (Dunwoody and Griffin,
2015). In fact, Yang and Kahlor (2013) found that while
positive affect about climate change (e.g., hope) was related to
information avoidance, negative affect (e.g., worry) was related
to higher information insufficiency and the intention to seek
information. Further, feeling personally threatened could bias
how search terms are generated in an online search: Participants
who were asked to reflect about a threat in their personal life
generated more positive search terms in an unrelated Internet
search than participants who were not instructed to think about
personal problems (Greving and Sassenberg, 2015).
Similar notions end empirical evidence can be found in the
literature on epistemic emotions, which are emotions directed
at achieving epistemic ends (Muis et al., 2015). For example,
enjoyment and curiosity may be positively related to the belief
that justifying a knowledge claim requires critical evaluation, and
anxiety and frustration may be lower when individuals believe
that knowledge is uncertain (Muis et al., 2015). As such, different
epistemic emotions may follow an experience of inconsistent or
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Epistemic beliefs have long been investigated as part of reasoning
and arguing about scientific information. Such beliefs about
the nature of knowledge and knowing (e.g., holding beliefs
about scientific knowledge being uncertain, complex, or needing
expert justification) may incite the use of reliable processes and
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Source Evaluation

strategies during OESI. Several studies in which students were
asked to think aloud during an online search have demonstrated
that students use their epistemic beliefs to define standards for
learning and accordingly select their strategies (Hofer, 2004;
Mason et al., 2010a,b, 2011; Barzilai and Zohar, 2012). For
example, beliefs about the complexity of an issue led individuals
to reflect on the need to compare several documents and collect
contrasting views (Mason et al., 2011), and the belief that
knowledge is given and stable did co-occur with less use of
strategies to actively construct knowledge from texts (Bråten
and Strømsø, 2006). A person’s epistemological understanding
ties in with her metacognitive processes and strategies (Kuhn,
1999; Muis, 2007; Barzilai and Zohar, 2016), as it may directly
influence the standards she sets for acquiring knowledge and
understanding (Muis, 2007). As such, Barzilai and Zohar (2016)
have argued that epistemic metacognitive knowledge (as a
specific part of metacognition) may “guide the execution of
cognitive-level epistemic strategies as well as their selection,
monitoring, and evaluation” (Barzilai and Zohar, 2016, p. 414).
Furthermore, epistemic beliefs may also affect how
effortfully individuals execute practices of OESI. Evidence
from studies using the think-aloud technique shows that
epistemic beliefs influence individuals’ abilities to engage in
evaluating information both while navigating the web—e.g.,
identifying argumentative fallacies (Mason et al., 2010b)—and
while reading (Ferguson et al., 2012; Iordanou et al., 2019b).
Further, viewing knowledge as tentative enhances meaningmaking as one deals with multiple documents (Bråten and
Strømsø, 2010) and supports credibility assessment of newspaper
articles, for example when they present simplified accounts of
an issue (Strømsø et al., 2011). Individuals with evaluativist
epistemic beliefs engage more often in evaluating the credibility
of evidence presented in texts and use scientific research as
their standard for judgment; for example, they might consider
the number of scientific studies supporting a particular piece
of evidence (Iordanou et al., 2019b). Besides supporting the
evaluation of single pieces of information, adequate epistemic
beliefs also support the evaluation and integration of multiple
pieces of information presented in different sources (Bråten
et al., 2011; Barzilai and Eshet-Alkalai, 2015). Empirical evidence
shows that adequate epistemic beliefs support the integration of
information during online learning (Barzilai and Zohar, 2012)
and during reading of multiple texts (Ferguson and Bråten,
2013), where comprehension mediates the relationship between
epistemic perspectives and information-source integration
(Barzilai and Eshet-Alkalai, 2015).
In sum, beliefs about the nature of scientific knowledge may
directly influence which strategies and practices are employed
during OESI (Muis, 2007; Barzilai and Zohar, 2016), and may also
affect the epistemic ideals by which epistemic ends are evaluated
(Chinn et al., 2014). That is, in addition to an individual’s
scientific literacy (see section Evidence Evaluation and Scientific
Literacy), her epistemic beliefs may inform how she assesses the
uncertainty and complexity of scientific information, and these
beliefs may also guide the selection and metacognitive regulation
of reliable processes for achieving her epistemic aims.
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Due to limited gatekeeping of scientific information online
(vs. editorial gatekeeping in scientific journals or traditional
media), evaluating the source of scientific information is an
especially important process within OESI, as it underlies the
selection, evaluation, and integration of credible information.
When retrospectively justifying document selection, students
used epistemic criteria (e.g., source type, author) less often than
non-epistemic criteria (e.g., order in the search list, relevance),
but the more epistemic justifications were made, the more
arguments and citations they presented in an open-ended search
result (List et al., 2016b). However, individuals prefer authors of
information to have good reputations (Rieh, 2002; Hilligoss and
Rieh, 2008; Winter and Krämer, 2012); more specifically, readers
tend to select blog posts by experts who possess relevant expertise
on the topic in question (Winter and Krämer, 2014) and prefer
disciplinary relatedness of search results to mere lexical similarity
with search terms (Keil and Kominsky, 2013).
Diverse research findings suggest a variety of cues that
individuals consider during source evaluation. First, the experts’
language use seems to affect how trustworthy she is perceived.
Individuals develop expectations about what constitutes
appropriate language in different social and cultural contexts,
and, thus, language accommodation or non-accommodation
by speakers (reflecting their intentions and motives) may
influence how individuals evaluate a speaker (Dragojevic et al.,
2016). For example, an expert’s use of technical language in
scientific information may lead to her being ascribed higher
expertise (Thon and Jucks, 2017) as well as higher integrity and
benevolence when her use of (technical) language is appropriate
to the context, e.g., when she uses less technical language when
addressing laypeople (vs. experts) in online health forums
(Zimmermann and Jucks, 2018), or less aggressive language
in an online video (König and Jucks, 2019). Furthermore, the
perception of a communicator in an online video as being
comprehensible and entertaining also led to higher ascriptions
of trustworthiness (Reif et al., 2020). Individuals also take an
expert’s motives into account when evaluating trustworthiness;
for example, readers were more inclined to trust a scientist
when they believed the scientist intended to inform rather than
persuade them (Rabinovich et al., 2012), when the scientist
provided a two-sided stance (instead of a one-sided stance)
(Mayweg-Paus and Jucks, 2018) or mentioned the ethical aspects
of a scientific issue (Hendriks et al., 2016). Furthermore, people
perceived a source to be less trustworthy when the source had
a vested interest in a claim (König and Jucks, 2019; Gierth and
Bromme, 2020); this even sometimes motivated people to engage
in effortful processing of complex evidence (Gierth and Bromme,
2020).
While these findings suggest that individuals are often able
to adequately judge the trustworthiness of sources, research on
“sourcing” (referring to when individuals pay attention to and
use source features, such as the author, but also publication date)
in multiple-document comprehension has found that students
often fail to pay attention to source information (Britt and
Aglinskas, 2002; Sandoval et al., 2016; for a review see, Brante and
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causality bias, such as when interpreting correlational data (Shah
et al., 2017). That is, new evidence may be rejected if it does not fit
within a broader single causal framework (Koslowski et al., 2008).
Further, it is unclear which type of evidence individuals consider
to be informative. Although some studies have indicated that
statistical evidence (citing a study), expert statements, and causal
evidence are perceived to be more persuasive than anecdotal
evidence (Hornikx, 2008), adding anecdotal stories into scientific
news articles decreased the extent to which participants engaged
in scientific reasoning about the evidence (Rodriguez et al.,
2016). Moreover, individuals often do not take multivariate
causality into consideration (Kuhn, 2020). Thus, successful
online information behavior on complex topics is constrained
by individuals’ tendencies to think simplistically about complex
issues instead understanding that most phenomena are caused by
multiple contributing factors or, for judgments of a non-causal
nature, taking multiple considerations into account (Kuhn and
Iordanou, 2020).
Basic scientific literacy will also likely help individuals
successfully evaluate and integrate scientific evidence.
Internationally, educational frameworks for scientific literacy
(e.g., OECD, 2017; National Research Council, 2012) have
emphasized that a central aim of science education should
be to familiarize students with processes of scientific inquiry,
evidence evaluation, and argumentation. Scientific literacy
has been ascribed three core dimensions: content knowledge
(about a few core scientific concepts), procedural knowledge,
and epistemic knowledge (Kind and Osborne, 2017). As such,
it is important to consider how individuals understand not only
the processes of doing science but also the modes by which it
achieves reliable knowledge, such as expert epistemic practices
(Golan Duncan et al., 2018). Kienhues et al. (2018) recently
argued that “science-based arguments can be understood and
judged by criteria on three layers of scientific knowledge:
(1) the ontology, (2) the methods and sources, and (3) the
social practices required for the generation and justification
of the argument” (Kienhues et al., 2018, p. 253). They argue
that everyday evaluation of scientific arguments may benefit
from switching between these layers. For example, when it
is not feasible to come to a conclusion about a scientific
issue based on reliable evidence (maybe due to conflicting
pieces of evidence), the individual may switch to investigating
which scientific processes were used, which will help them
identify which argument is backed by stronger evidence. If
that is not feasible, the individual might judge whether the
conflicting positions might be partly due to the complexity of
the topic or the motivations of the involved experts behind the
conflicting positions (Dieckmann et al., 2017; Thomm et al.,
2017). Even if someone has limited content knowledge, they
can still be successful in assessing a scientific issue online by
determining, for example, whether there is consensus among
scientists about an issue (a social practice of science; Oreskes,
2007; van der Linden et al., 2015) and then adopting the
consensus view.
To summarize the two previous sections, individuals
themselves often cannot adequately evaluate the credibility of
a provided scientific claim, and some have argued that in such

Strømsø, 2017). In fact, when evaluating multiple documents,
individuals may not attend to author competence at all, and
younger individuals (in elementary and middle-school) even
failed to do so when explicitly prompted to evaluate sources
(Macedo-Rouet et al., 2019a; Paul et al., 2019).
However, interacting with online information might not
hinder successful sourcing per se. For example, reading an
online document (instead of its printed-out version) increased
memory for sources, which helped readers construct coherent
interpretations of the issue at hand (Salmerón et al., 2017); that
is, it helped them integrate information. Further, interacting
with multiple sources is more effective than reading a single
source for text comprehension and establishing source and
content integration (e.g., Le Bigot and Rouet, 2007; Stadtler
et al., 2013; Stang Lund et al., 2019); that is, individuals seem
to have increased awareness about source information and create
stronger content-source links when a conflict cannot be resolved
by content information alone (Braasch et al., 2012; Strømsø
et al., 2013; Stadtler and Bromme, 2014) or when information
conflicts with prior beliefs about a topic (Bråten et al., 2016). As
such, conflicts within single or multiple texts, as well as conflicts
between newly acquired information and prior knowledge,
might promote more effortful and strategic evaluation of
sources (Braasch and Bråten, 2017). Further, relevant prior
topic knowledge seems to benefit individuals’ sourcing abilities
(Stang Lund et al., 2019), whereas individuals with low prior
knowledge may even prefer untrustworthy information sources
(Bråten et al., 2011). In sum, while individuals use many
different cues to determine source trustworthiness, encountering
conflicting information about socio-scientific issues online seems
to motivate individuals to engage in more effortful (source)
evaluation and integration of information.

Evidence Evaluation and Scientific Literacy
Evaluating the strength of evidence (or even its inner-scientific
significance) should be central to individuals’ consideration of
information from a normative standpoint, but this is challenging
for laypeople considering the uncertainty and complexity of
scientific information and their own bounded understanding of
science (Bromme and Goldman, 2014). One possibility to rate
the credibility of scientific claims would be to assess argument
strength and structure, for example whether a claim is backed by
evidence. While laypeople adequately assess argument strength to
be greater when it is supported by a greater amount of evidence
(Corner and Hahn, 2009; Hendriks et al., 2020), they may
sometimes not take prior studies into account when assessing
the probability of an effect to be true (Thompson et al., 2020).
Individuals might assume that the tentativeness included in
scientific information means that the scientific results have
limited credibility (Flemming et al., 2015); however, in one
study that gave readers a refutation text alerting them that this
assumption is wrong, the assumption was successfully reduced
(Flemming et al., 2020). Similarly, a stronger epistemic belief
regarding the uncertainty of science might alleviate the adverse
effects of scientific tentativeness on the credibility of information
(Rabinovich and Morton, 2012; Kimmerle et al., 2015). However,
when making inferences from evidence, people may follow a
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a case it is instead more feasible to evaluate the trustworthiness
of the information source (Bromme and Goldman, 2014;
Hendriks and Kienhues, 2019). That is, holding epistemic
ideals regarding the justification of knowledge in consensus,
or by a highly trustworthy source might be more beneficial for
deciding whether to accept online information as provisionally
true. Hence, instead of asking “What is true?,” individuals can
rather solve the problem by asking “Whom do I believe?”
(Bromme et al., 2010; Stadtler and Bromme, 2014). Hendriks
et al. (2015) define epistemic trust as the willingness of a person
to depend on an information source for knowledge; this trust is
not blind, however, but relies on a person’s epistemic vigilance
toward cues that indicate whether an information source
might be deceptive or ignorant (Sperber et al., 2010). In digital
settings, evaluations of epistemic trustworthiness of expert
sources rely on considering an expert’s expertise (possessing
relevant knowledge), integrity (adhering to the rules of their
profession), and benevolence (having the interest of others at
heart) (Hendriks et al., 2015).

an individual’s social group (Kahan, 2013). For example, group
identity may cause individuals to apply defensive motivations
when reading about scientific issues and, in consequence, might
further strengthen the text-belief consistency effect (Maier et al.,
2018). In one study, Nauroth et al. (2015) showed that people
who self-identified with the social group of gamers devalued
identity-threatening scientific information (e.g., playing video
games increases violence in youth) that was presented in a science
blog, and, when allowed to post a comment, they criticized
the methodology of the scientific study. Further, in another
study identity-threatening information affected how reputable
and competent participants perceived the scientist authors to be
(Nauroth et al., 2017). However, biased evaluation of scientific
evidence may not only arise from an identity threat but also
from a threat to one’s general values. For example, the more
central a person held non-violence to be in their self-concept,
the more positively they evaluated a scientific study that claimed
video games promote violence (Bender et al., 2016). Also, expert
sources may be considered more credible when the ethical
stance of the reader aligns with that of the source, leading
to higher agreement with the source’s claims (Scharrer et al.,
2019).
In sum, prior beliefs and attitudes may play a central—
and often detrimental—role in establishing a task model for
searching for scientific information, as well as evaluating and
integrating information. However, sometimes, prior beliefs may
motivate effortful processing and evaluation of documents
(Rouet and Britt, 2011; List and Alexander, 2017b; Rouet
et al., 2017)—for example by eliciting curiosity by being
unexpected (see section Emotion and Motivation) or evoking
situational interest—allowing individuals to switch from belief
protection to belief reflection (List and Alexander, 2017b).
By judging the plausibility (“the potential truthfulness of a
claim”; Sinatra and Lombardi, 2020, p. 5) individuals may
utilize their prior knowledge by allowing them to select the
most likely alternative, especially when an issue is contradictory
and uncertain. Lombardi et al. (2016) provided a theoretical
framework for plausibility judgments, which entail (a) alignment
with prior knowledge and beliefs, (b) complexity of and (c)
perceived conjecture within novel information, (d) judgments
of source trustworthiness, and (e) the individual’s heuristic
processing and possible biases. Plausibility judgments may
be guided by different degrees of evaluation. While most
judgments are implicit (due to a preference for heuristic
processing, see above), individuals’ epistemic dispositions
and motives (e.g., need for cognition) may lead to more
effortful processing. Further, if motivated (e.g., if they are
interested and self-efficient), individuals may also reappraise
their original judgements, guided by more explicit processing
and increased effort in reasoning. In consequence, Sinatra
and Lombardi (2020) suggested that fostering individuals’
capabilities to quickly make plausibility judgments about
information—by efficiently employing their prior beliefs and
knowledge—may be more fruitful in “post-truth” contexts
(similar to the contexts we previously described for OESI)
than training effortful strategies to evaluate information and
its sources.

(Prior) Attitudes and Beliefs
Prior topic knowledge and attitudes can affect processes of
individual engagement from the start of setting up a task
model search to the (internal) formulation of a solution. On
the one hand, prior topic knowledge and attitudes can result
in individuals using more appropriate keywords and selecting
more relevant information (e.g., MaKinster et al., 2002), on
the other hand, they may also bias the information search.
Selective exposure to information (sometimes referred to as
confirmation bias) means that an individual is more likely
to select attitude-consistent information (Fischer et al., 2005;
Rothmund et al., 2015; Knobloch-Westerwick et al., 2020),
and also evaluate that information more favorably (van Strien
et al., 2016; Strømsø et al., 2017). An explanation for selective
exposure during an information search might be defense goals,
whereby an individual ignores or dismisses counter-attitudinal
information to preserve their own worldview (Cappella et al.,
2015; Winter et al., 2016). Nevertheless, those information
seekers with high need for cognition are more likely to select
two-sided information (e.g., suggested by the link title) for
further reading (Winter and Krämer, 2012). Prior knowledge
and attitudes may also detrimentally affect the evaluation and
integration of scientific information online. Arguably, prior
beliefs are internal representation with which newly acquired
information has to be integrated. Richter (2015) assumes
a “text-belief consistency effect” for integrating information
into mental (situation) models. In fact, research shows that
prior beliefs and attitudes might affect the way a person
evaluates information and integrates new evidence into their
internal representation of an issue. Chinn and Brewer (1998)
showed that only in very few cases did anomalous evidence
(evidence inconsistent with individuals’ already established
theories) result in careful consideration and adaptation of
individuals’ theories; often, such evidence was just ignored
or discounted.
Motivated reasoning is also an important drive for rejecting
information that is not consistent with the dominant belief in
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DIALOGIC ENGAGEMENT

receiver, and messages are characterized by low responsiveness.
The second type allows for two-way directional communication,
as the receiver of a message becomes a sender and is, therefore,
responsive to the information provided (or posted). However,
only the third type enables real interactivity in a two-way flow of
messages between users and is, therefore, highly responsive. Here,
such interactive messages encourage the interaction to continue
back and forth. Consequently, the transmission of information
can be seen as the center of interaction, and interactivity seems
to be a central attribute of the process of communication itself
(Rafaeli and Ariel, 2007; Ariel and Avidar, 2015).

Besides seeking and evaluating information independently to
form beliefs, OESI includes engaging in discourse with others
to share, interpret and critically examine scientific information.
In this sense, social media platforms have emerged not only
as an important source of information (Head and Eisenberg,
2010; Kim et al., 2014), but also as a public forum for engaging
with science (Baram-Tsabari and Schejter, 2019). In fact, we
perceive individual and dialogic engagement as reciprocal
processes. For example, individually forming an understanding
of an issue is immediately beneficial for constructing arguments
when engaging in dialogue with others, and, conversely,
dialogue and deliberation with others might one to revise their
original understanding (see section Reciprocity of Dialogic and
Individual Engagement).
When we consider OESI as a social process, it involves the
overlapping processes of interpreting information, building
arguments from that information and contrasting those
arguments with competing arguments. Berland and Reiser
(2009) propose that these processes, which they refer to as
sensemaking, articulation and persuasion, respectively, form
the foundation of scientific argumentation. Although scientific
argumentation can be an individual process, as a dialogic process
it presents a unique set of affordances and constraints. In the
following sections, we explore these affordances and constraints
and propose ways in which scientific argumentation as a social
process can be leveraged to focus the epistemic aims and
outcomes of OESI.

Types and Goals of Dialogue
When we think about using information to communicate with
others online, we should also think about the purpose of
such communication. Two-way communication, or dialogue,
can be divided into different types, each with a particular
set of epistemic aims (Rapanta and Christodoulou, 2019).
Walton (2010) identifies seven dialogue types that apply
to communication in both face-to-face and online settings.
These are information-seeking, discovery, inquiry, deliberation,
negotiation, persuasion, and eristic dialogue (or “irrational
dispute”). All are argumentative insofar as speakers posit how
information can be brought to bear on claims, but they differ
in their initial state and intended outcomes. For example, both
inquiry and persuasion involve making claims with evidence,
but inquiry focuses on collecting evidence to test claims, while
persuasion focuses on citing claims and evidence to defend a
conclusion. Dialogue types can also be distinguished by their
social-emotional goals. To get at the role that personal stakes can
play in dialogue, Asterhan (2013) proposes a distinction between
competitive interpersonal goals and collaborative interpersonal
goals. The former are competitive in that speakers take an
adversarial stance on what they perceive to be zero-sum
outcomes, and the latter are collaborative in that speakers take
a cooperative stance on what they see as a shared enterprise.
It is important to note that these interpersonal goal states are
distinguishable from dialogue types. Some dialogue types may be
more likely than others to trigger competitive interpersonal goals
(persuasion, negotiation, and eristic, for example), while others
may tend toward collaborative interpersonal goals (informationseeking, inquiry, and deliberation). However, interpersonal
goals represent social-emotional outcomes that are distinct
from the competitive or collaborative epistemic aims used to
define dialogue types (except perhaps for eristic argument,
which is primarily driven by interpersonal conflict). For
example, negotiations can be conducted either collaboratively or
competitively, depending on the stance, strategies, and dialogic
moves chosen by each party (Lewicki et al., 2001). Likewise,
although deliberations aim at group consensus, they may unfold
as either collaborative or adversarial exchanges depending on the
ways in which interpersonal dynamics emerge and are negotiated
during dialogue (Tuler, 2000).
Based upon these considerations, we now focus on the
potential benefits of argumentative dialogue as a two-way
communication mode for addressing OESI in the context

Constraints and of Affordances of the
Online Information Environment to Dialogic
Engagement
Many different social media platforms exist, and their functions
range from social networking and community building to
collaborative knowledge construction and sharing (Leonardi,
2015; Krancher et al., 2018). Building on these potential
functions, social media platforms may benefit the motivations
and outcomes of OESI (Gao et al., 2012). However, to understand
and to exploit the full potential of communication for using
online information successfully with others on social media,
we need to consider the role that a social media platform’s
characteristics play in users’ abilities to select and establish
network connections and to interact with other users (DeNardis,
2014). Following Ariel and Avidar (2015), the degree of
interactivity is thereby not primarily determined by the technical
features of a platform (interactivity as a medium characteristic)
but rather by the actual aims and behaviors of its users
(interactivity as a process-related variable). In other words,
social networks such as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram do
not necessarily produce interactive communication behavior per
se, but rather they provide opportunities for different ways of
communicative exchange.
In this regard, Rafaeli (1988) interactivity model suggests
three possible types of messages in communication. The first
type refers to one-way communication between a sender and a
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elaborating their arguments, disagree without explaining why,
and advance a barrage of arguments without addressing each
other’s counterarguments (Felton et al., 2015b). On the other
hand, two-way communication can also trigger collaborative
interpersonal goals that undermine dialogue. Several studies
suggest that face threat can lead speakers to avoid critical
discussion (See, e.g., Asterhan, 2013; Felton et al., 2019). The
phenomenon may be particularly problematic when speakers
encounter disagreement unexpectedly during in-group dialogue.
In these circumstances, speakers are more likely to prioritize
group or interpersonal cohesion over engaging in critical
discussion and transactive dialogue (Concannon et al., 2015).

of dealing with (conflicting) scientific knowledge and socioscientific issues. Numerous studies point out that dealing
with complex content within argumentative dialogue has a
positive effect on reasoning about information in online contexts
[an overview is given in a meta-analysis by Noroozi et al.
(2012)]. In order to successfully co-construct an elaborated
understanding of an issue (e.g., Teasley, 1997; Chi, 2009), users
need to apply “reasoning that operates on the reasoning of
another” (transactivity, Berkowitz and Gibbs, 1983, p. 402).
In this sense, transactive dialogue as a specific form a twoway argumentative requires coherent reference and mutual
elaboration of each other’s contributions by aiming at the
integration of different knowledge backgrounds and perspectives
(Asterhan and Schwarz, 2016). However, before well-elaborated
consensus building is achieved, each contribution needs to
be scrutinized critically (conflict-oriented consensus building;
Fischer et al., 2002). Accordingly, an important feature of
this type of consensus building is that individuals do not
accept contributions of their partners as they are. In this
context, efficient communication comprises strategies that
directly address and challenge the argumentative structure and
content (e.g., scientific evidence) of the other’s contributions
(Mayweg-Paus and Macagno, 2016; Mayweg-Paus et al., 2016a).
In particular, critical questioning seems to be a strong
argumentative strategy given its capacity to address deeper
grounds of disagreement, bringing into light background
knowledge and knowledge beliefs that might otherwise escape
attention. In such cases, a goal is to avoid pseudo-agreements
or pseudo-disagreements (Jucks and Paus, 2013) and to focus
the discussion on the true source of differences in opinion.
Consequently, asking critical questions seems to play a pivotal
role in the context of knowledge construction (Chinn and
Osborne, 2008) and for developing insights into not only sciencerelated issues (Mayweg-Paus et al., 2016b; Thiebach et al., 2016)
but also history (Wissinger and De La Paz, 2016) and public
policy (Song and Ferretti, 2013).
When individuals hold one another accountable to standards
for accurately collecting and interpreting information and validly
using information as evidence, two-way communication offers
distinct advantages over one-way communication. However, a
two-way discussion can also undermine the quality of reasoning
about evidence. The same set of forces that drive motivated
reasoning when individuals think alone [see section (Prior)
Attitudes and Beliefs] can also compromise reasoning when
we engage in dialogue. Critical discussions, particularly those
that polarize views on a topic (Kuhn and Lao, 1996), can
prompt individuals to both overvalue confirming evidence and
discount disconfirming evidence (Schulz-Hardt et al., 2002).
This phenomenon is particularly concerning in Internet forums
that attract users with polarized views on public issues [Baek
et al., 2012; see also section (Prior) Attitudes and Beliefs].
Dialogue can also elicit adversarial behaviors that undermine the
potential benefits of two-way communication. Thus, under some
conditions, the competitive epistemic goals of persuasion can
trigger competitive interpersonal goals that foreclose transactive
dialogue (Asterhan, 2013; Felton et al., 2019). When speakers
confuse the two goals, they tend to repeat themselves without
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Diverging Opinions and Dialogic
Engagement
Collaboratively achieving epistemic aims in dialogic argument
depends substantially on the discourse partners’ efforts to
deeply elaborate on and challenge their partner’s knowledge
and arguments (e.g., Kuhn and Udell, 2003). In this context,
the dialogic character (or two-way mode) of argumentation
can support OESI through (a) enhancing the quality of
argumentation and the use of evidence (Crowell and Kuhn,
2014; Mayweg-Paus and Macagno, 2016) and (b) the evaluation
and reconciliation of diverging claims (Nussbaum and Edwards,
2011; Felton et al., 2015a). In an argumentative dialogue, a person
is subject to the interlocutor’s scrutiny of her own position, which
enhances her need to be more critical not only toward her own
position but also the opposing one. In such dialogues, the reasons
for preferring one point of view or one piece of evidence over
another must be analyzed by taking a critical stance toward the
presented evidence (Osborne et al., 2004). This challenge can
only be addressed by drawing on more sufficient evidence and
elaborating more and in greater depth on the different viewpoints
and their backings (burden of proof, Walton and Macagno, 2007;
Macagno and Walton, 2012).
There are several ways to address these potential challenges
to effortful two-way, critical discussion. One effective strategy
is to mitigate or de-emphasize competitive interpersonal goals
by focusing attention on the epistemic aims of discourse.
In the context of one-way communication, giving individuals
specific instructions to generate reasons (Ferretti et al.,
2000) or counter-arguments and rebuttals (Nussbaum and
Kardash, 2005) have reduced my-side bias in writing when
compared with instructions to persuade the audience. In
two-way communication, focusing on collaborative epistemic
aims (deliberation) as opposed to competitive epistemic aims
(persuasion) in dialogue can lead to decreased interpersonal
competitive behaviors and an increase in transactive dialogue
(Felton et al., 2015b). These same conditions can also mitigate
confirmation bias (Villarroel et al., 2016). However, it is
important to note that in these studies, speakers were paired with
someone who disagreed with them on the topic of discussion,
and, therefore, the studies were designed to elicit the critical
dialogue. But also, explicit expressions of disagreement in
Youtube comment sections have the potential foster collaborative
interaction (Dubovi and Tabak, 2020). What emerges in studies
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recognizing multiperspectivity does not automatically mean one
can apply sophisticated strategies when evaluating opposing
views or arguments. Based on several empirical findings, Kuhn
(2019) addresses this point by suggesting that understanding
multivariable causality is a link toward evaluating and integrating
multiple perspectives. Following this approach, OESI should
include information- (or knowledge-) seeking activities for
identifying and negotiating the multiple factors that can cause a
phenomenon and to bring them into ongoing discussion.
In sum, dialogic engagement can take a number of forms
depending on interactivity (one-way, two-way bounded, twoway unbounded), epistemic purposes (information seeking,
discovery, inquiry, deliberation, negotiation, persuasion, eristic),
and interpersonal dynamics of communication (collaborative,
competitive). When we combine these variables, a complex
array of permutations results. When individuals engage with
others online about information, they gain access to critical
dialogue that can enhance reasoning by focusing attention on
the epistemic aims, ideals and reliable processes governing
the use of information (Chinn et al., 2014). These epistemic
concerns, when combined with critical dialogue, enhance
reasoning about information and may even promote growth that
transfers to individual engagement. However, to be successful
in this endeavor, individuals must work collaboratively with
others to examine their reasoning, even when epistemic aims
are competitive.

that compare competitive and collaborative epistemic aims is
an optimization problem. Dissent is a valuable component in
overcoming motivated reasoning, particularly when measures
are taken to reduce the risk of losing face (Schulz-Hardt et al.,
2006). Thus, dialogue can be structured to explicitly make
room for dissent (Schulz-Hardt et al., 2006). However, cognitive
engagement is an important ingredient in such conversations
(Kuhn and Lao, 1996), and focusing on transactive dialogue
aimed at epistemic aims enhances the quality of reasoning.
Individuals must hold themselves accountable to expressing
disagreement when it arises to avoid quick consensus while
simultaneously focusing on collaborative interpersonal goals
to promote transactive dialogue (Asterhan, 2013; Thiebach
et al., 2016). Ultimately, collaboratively achieving epistemic aims
involves focusing dialogue on epistemic aims while threading
the needle of interpersonal goals to produce a social-emotional
context that fosters critical discussion.

Reciprocity of Dialogic and Individual
Engagement
Collaboratively dealing with diverging (or even conflicting)
claims might hold potential for the development of individual
epistemological understanding, as it brings into light the
existence of multiple perspectives and can promote a more
balanced integration of pro and counter arguments in one’s line
of reasoning. Empirical evidence shows that individuals—after
engaging in intervention studies that allowed them to engage
in both argumentation with peers through the computer and
in reflective activities for an extended period of time—showed
improvements in their ability to evaluate others’ arguments
and the evidence that supported their arguments (Iordanou
and Constantinou, 2015; Mayweg-Paus et al., 2016b). Further,
engaging in an online discourse with peers who held an
opposing view (vs. the same view) led to different inquiry
behavior during online discussions and to different gains in
terms of argument skills. In particular, in Iordanou and Kuhn
(2020) study, individuals who engaged online in discussions
with peers holding an opposing view chose to search for
information regarding the opposing alternative first when
given the opportunity. In contrast, individuals who engaged in
online discussions with same-side individuals preferred to seek
information related to their own position. Differences were also
observed in the prevalence and types of functional evidencebased argumentive idea units in individual final essays, and
they favored the students who engaged online in discussions
with peers holding an opposing view. Here, engagement in
online discussions with individuals holding opposing or sameside views may have fostered an epistemological understanding
of recognizing that the other is reasoning from a perspective
different from one’s own, but that this perspective is still worth
examining (Iordanou and Kuhn, 2020), or that it is important
to take a step back and re-evaluate one’s own understanding
(Forzani, 2019). However, most people typically show difficulties
with being able “to construct fully justified dual-position
arguments and to explain and reconcile differences between
accounts” (Barzilai and Ka’adan, 2017, p. 223). Apparently,
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CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
In this paper, we have addressed conditions that may benefit,
but also hinder effortful online engagement with scientific
information (OESI). The Internet offers users immediate access
to a wide variety of information on socio-scientific issues, and
also allows for user agency and interactivity. Coiro (2015)
argued that, in theory, the Internet is an ideal place to engage
with (scientific) information to achieve deeper learning and
understanding and—from a reading perspective—she presents
strategies learners need to achieve such epistemic aims. However,
it is not feasible to assume that readers will allocate their cognitive
and motivational resources to the systematic processing of all
information they find online regarding an issue of interest
(Stadtler, 2017). As such, our review collects literature on
cognitive and motivational processes that may help individuals
overcome constraints and utilize affordances of scientific
information in the online environment. Before concluding this
literature review with a discussion of our heuristic model of OESI,
we elaborate on how to foster individual and dialogic OESI in
(higher) education.
We have discussed several context factors that may both
constrain and motivate effortful OESI. Dealing with the
uncertainty and complexity of scientific knowledge (emphasized
in online information environments) is a challenge that might
be hard to overcome (Kienhues et al., 2020). In consequence,
individuals might often encounter conflicts—of newly acquired
information with their own beliefs, between information sources,
or between their beliefs and those of their dialogue partner.
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or sequential. While individual engagement might prepare the
individual to engage in dialogue with others, such dialogic
engagement might not only induce more individual engagement,
but it may also foster skills and strategies needed for practices
in individual engagement. Engaging learners in collaborative
reasoning and argumentation about scientific information fosters
individuals’ epistemic cognition (e.g., Iordanou, 2016; Fisher
et al., 2017), but it also creates a space to collaboratively reflect
and elaborate on online scientific information in two ways: First,
individuals may discuss the quality of online information, and,
second, they may critically reflect and reason collaboratively on
the criteria that guided their evaluations (Barzilai and Chinn,
2018). Thus, dialogue with others entails the potential to reflect
on both one’s own and others’ individual engagement practices
(Mayweg-Paus et al., 2020). In particular, to promote the
development of epistemological understanding in their students,
educational scholars need to address searching to learn as an
information-seeking activity within the process of argumentation
as well as learning to search in the context of argumentative
dialogue (Redfors et al., 2014), which works as a mechanism for
critical reflection on sourcing strategies, information providers,
and media, and may also serve knowledge co-construction
(Dubovi and Tabak, 2020). In this way, online dialogue becomes
not only a medium for the transfer of information but also
a means by which we gain epistemological insight into the
nature of information and its many uses in our communication
with others.
In our heuristic model, two aspects are not discussed in
further depth. First, we decided not to define the cognitive and
behavioral manifestations of the practices of engagement. Several
descriptive models and literature reviews exist that describe one
or several of these practices and their interrelations in more
detail (in the context of multiple documents comprehension:
e.g., Rouet and Britt, 2011; List and Alexander, 2017a; 2017b;
epistemic cognition: e.g., Chinn et al., 2011, 2014; digital literacy:
e.g., Cho and Afflerbach, 2017; Coiro, 2020; functional scientific
literacy: e.g., Tabak, 2015). Second, we have not described how
individuals would achieve their epistemic aims (the outcome
of engagement), and whether it is always feasible to assume
that individuals would always achieve these through goaldirected and effortful OESI. While there are models outlining
knowledge integration with prior information (Richter, 2015),
integration of diverging sources (Braasch and Bråten, 2017),
and knowledge co-construction through collaborative dialogue
and argumentation (Asterhan and Schwarz, 2016; Iordanou
et al., 2019a), further research should investigate how knowledge
construction takes place in authentic online information search
(in contrast to dealing with provided information—often in
text form—in a research or classroom setting), especially taking
into account online-specific constraints and affordances. Newer
studies have increasingly included combinations of process and
outcome variables to more comprehensively examine online
engagement (e.g., Bråten et al., 2014a,b; List and Alexander,
2018; Kammerer et al., 2020), or even tested theoretical models
linking cognition, motivation, and learning (e.g., Muis et al.,
2015). Furthermore, goal-directed and effortful OESI requires
metacognitive knowledge and skills, such as current updates of

As this review has shown, critical and deliberative scrutiny of
information is central to OESI. That is, engagement should
be directed at achieving epistemic aims while holding oneself
and others accountable to appropriate epistemic ideals, at
applying reliable processes in information search, selection,
evaluation, integration, and in engaging in dialogue with others
(in line with apt epistemic performance, Barzilai and Chinn,
2018). However, as we have discussed, cognitive biases (such
as confirmation bias, motivated cognition, and competitive
interpersonal goals) constrain otherwise reliable processes and
may sometimes emerge under the guise of “critical thinking”
(e.g., being critical toward experts’ claims also has become a
rhetorical device of science skeptics). As such, in order to counter
one-sided reasoning and argumentation, open-minded thinking
is directly beneficial to effortful OESI, because it entails the
willingness to hold up all views (including one’s own) under
scrutiny of critical examination, even taking on the risk of
identity threats, in order to follow through with epistemic aims
(Taylor, 2016). Open-mindedness has been shown to not only
benefit individual engagement with scientific information, such
as knowledge about scientific issues and argument evaluation
(Sinatra et al., 2003; Southerland and Sinatra, 2006; West
et al., 2008), but also dialogic engagement in dialogue with
others (Kuhn and Udell, 2003, 2007). We argue that it is
through a balance of (individual or dialogic) critical examination
of information and open-minded thinking that goal-directed
and effortful OESI emerges. Sharon and Baram-Tsabari (2020)
provide examples of several educational approaches to foster
open-minded thinking, such as exposure to exemplars of virtues
and practicing virtuous behaviors.
One environment that holds high potential for directly
instructing critical and open-minded thinking by employing
authentic search tasks is higher education classrooms. This
environment is suitable for two reasons: First, students are
already instructed to successfully deal with theories, models,
evidence, and arguments within their discipline. Golan Duncan
et al. (2018) identify that understanding experts’ evidentiary
practices (how experts analyze, evaluate, interpret, and integrate
evidence to derive and inform theories) and being able to rely
on scientific evidence even though one’s own understanding
of science is bounded (lay epistemic practices) are central for
laypeople’s ability to deal with scientific evidence. Searching for
information on socio-scientific topics (related somewhat to a
learner’s area of expertise) is an ill-structured but solvable task,
and it may also allow for reflection of the boundaries of students’
expertise, especially when they are granted the opportunity to
engage in dialogue with students from different disciplinary
backgrounds or with diverging views on the issue. Second, while
scientific inquiry tasks, such as lab work, are important to
achieve procedural knowledge in their own discipline, there is
limited opportunity for learners to engage in understanding of
the social processes that are used to create reliable knowledge;
however, both scientific knowledge as well as digital media entail
social affordances allowing for dialogic engagement in authentic
search tasks.
We have previously argued that the two parts—individual
and dialogic engagement—are reciprocal rather than separate
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(e.g., psychology, educational sciences, communication science,
information sciences). We hope that future research would strive
toward further integration of theoretical ideas and models within
and across disciplinary bounds.

the search task and monitoring of one’s process (Barzilai and
Chinn, 2018). A few studies have used think-aloud methods
to investigate individuals’ (epistemic) meta-cognition during
online engagement (e.g., Mason et al., 2011; Barzilai and Zohar,
2012). While we think that such approaches should guide future
empirical investigations into practices within OESI, our literature
review also shows that there is ample research and evidence that
future studies may build on.
Furthermore, our heuristic model of OESI could be extended
in the future to include a larger variety of online information.
Information technologies are constantly changing and with them
users’ access to information (e.g., on different devices, in different
apps), information formats (e.g., interactive representations
and video), information design (e.g., the use of nudges), and
distribution (e.g., by algorithms, artificial intelligence). Hence,
engagement with online information (and dealing with new and
unique constraints and affordances) might already or will in the
future involve even more steps, strategies, or skills (as well as
many more variables mediating their effortful execution) than
we have discussed in this review. Research on users’ cognition
and behavior in dealing with online scientific information—
and especially on communication formats beyond informational
text—is still sparse, but is growing in different disciplines
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